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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS PICKETING
NAACP v. Overstreet
321 Ga. 16, 142 &.2d 816,
cert. granted, 382 U.S. 937 (1965)*
Is the right to reputation or good will more important than the right to
protest against discrimination? This question arises when a business which
has allegedly practiced racial discrimination sues to recover damages caused
by civil rights picketing. Picketing can damage the reputation or good will
of a business, and society has an interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation. But, there is a conflict between this interest and the values
promoted by the first and fourteenth amendments. When interests in public
discussion are particularly strong, the Constitution should limit the protec-
tion afforded by the civil law of picketing.' To what extent is civil rights
picketing protected by the Constitution? This question was recently con-
sidered by the Georgia Supreme Court.
The owner of a grocery store in Savannah, Georgia recovered 35,793
dollars compensatory damages and 50,000 dollars punitive damages in an
action against the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), the Savannah chapter of the NAACP, and two of its
officers for conspiring to destroy his business by unlawful picketing. The
grocer allegedly beat and discharged a fourteen-year-old Negro employee for
alleged stealing. Officers of the Savannah branch called a public meeting to
protest the beating and organized a picket line in front of the store urging a
boycott. A crowd of angry Negroes gathered; several acts of violence were
committed; customers were frightened away. Defendants argued that since
no NAACP picket committed any unlawful acts, the trial court's judgment
violated constitutionally protected freedom of association. The argument was
rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court. The court also held that the picket-
ing was not constitutionally protected freedom of speech for two reasons.
Firstly, the court found that the grocer had not been motivated by racial
prejudice and that the sole purpose of the picketing was to avenge the beat-
ing; this purpose was held unlawful because courts, not private persons, should
punish criminal acts. Secondly, the court found that picketing around the
store incited mass picketing, force, violence, intimidation, and harassment
which constituted picketing in an unlawful manner.
When does the Constitution protect civil rights pickets from civil lia-
bility? Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider a case of this kind,
it has developed policies which seemingly do protect them from liability. The
* At the date this issue went to press, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvi-
dently granted in a 5-4 decision. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1966; p. 20C, col. 3.
1 The Constitution looks at the content of the communication evaluated in the con-
text of its social and political setting, and not just at the form of communication. Hence,
freedom of speech is not limited to verbal communication, but may also include picket-
ing. Brown v. Louisiana, 34 U.S.L. Week 4143 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1966).
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Georgia decision raises a variety of issues which demonstrate that the prob-
lem is to identify these policies and discover when they apply. The problem
will be approached within the following framework: (1) Upon what grounds
should the Supreme Court review a decision awarding damages for picketing
a business which has allegedly practiced racial discrimination? (2) Should
the Court examine the evidence to see if it supports the judgment? (3) What
criteria should it use to determine what is constitutionally protected
picketing?
GROUNDS FOR SUP EmE CouRT REviEw
The NAACP argued that the judgment violated both its freedom of
speech and its freedom of association. Although the Court has not con-
sidered a case involving civil liability for civil rights picketing, it has used
both freedoms to protect civil rights organizations and their self-help tech-
niques2 from the criminal laws of the various states. 3 These decisions make
it clear that the Court has recognized the right of Negroes to organize to
protest against racial discrimination. What a state may not do through its
criminal law should likewise be beyond the reach of its civil laws.4 Fear of
damage awards may be markedly more inhibiting than fear of criminal con-
victions. 5 Hence, the Supreme Court should review and reverse a judgment
for unlawful picketing if it imposes civil liability upon constitutionally pro-
tected conduct. But, what conduct is protected by freedom of association
and freedom of speech?
Freedom of Association
Rights of free association are recognized as conferred by the first amend-
ment. This gives some needed protection to civil rights organizations operat-
2 The self-help tactics of civil rights organizations have generated extensive litiga-
tion involving injunctions and criminal convictions for criminal trespass, breach of the
peace, obstruction of sidewalks, and injury to trade or commerce, but this author found
no cases prior to this one in which damages were sought. See 5 Race Rd. L. Rep. 935
(1960); Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1284 (1964).
3 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), held that breach of the peace
convictions arising out of a demonstration at a state house violated freedom of speech;
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), held that application of Virginia's barratry
statute to the NAACP's efforts to facilitate the Negro's access to the courts violated free-
dom of association.
4 But see Avins & Crutchfield, "Prime Fade Tort and Injunction-New Remedies
Against Sitdowns," 23 Ala. Law. 163 (1962). The authors suggest that civil remedies may
be beyond the scope of Supreme Court review.
5 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), held that recovery for libel of
a public official requires proof of actual malice. Mr. Justice Brennan stated, "What a
state may not do by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil
law of libel. The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama
courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal
statute." Id. at 277. To support his conclusion the Justice pointed out that convictions
result in fnes much smaller than possible damage awards and that criminal actions are
surrounded by procedural safeguards not present in civil actions.
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ing in hostile southern states.6 The Court has reasoned that freedom of
speech is meaningless to Negroes unless they can form organizations to
assert their rights.7 Thus, if a state court decision discriminates against such
an organization, either by discouraging membership in it or by destroying
its effectiveness, freedom of association is violated. For example, NAACP v.
Alabama" held that a state may not require the production of membership
lists because the social and economic repercussions would deter sympathizers
from joining the organization. Nor may a state destroy the effectiveness of
an organization by forbidding activities which are essential for it to protect
the rights of its members. This principle was developed in NAACP v. Button
which held that a state may not apply its barratry statute to the NAACP's
efforts to assist Negroes to assert their rights in the courts.
The reasoning of Alabama and Button is relevant to consideration of
civil liability for civil rights picketing. A hostile court should not be per-
mitted to cripple financially organizations such as the NAACP by misread-
ing the evidence or misapplying the law.10 Such a tactic would certainly be
as clear a violation of freedom of association as requiring the production of
membership lists; for sympathizers would not contribute money to the or-
6 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP
v. Button 371 US. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
7 In NAACP v. Alabama, supra note 6, at 460, Mr. Justice Harlan stated, "It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." For a discussion of the
evolution of the freedom of association doctrine and its relation to freedom of speech
see Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-84
(1965); Fellman, "Constitutional Rights of Association," 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 74.
8 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
9 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The protection afforded Negroes by freedom of association
may be closely related to the protection afforded by equal protection and freedom of
speech. Tussman & tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws," 37 Calif. L. Rev.
341 (1949), describe how the protection afforded Negroes by the equal protection clause
developed out of due process principles. Freedom of association may be based on a
similar metamorphosis. But, whereas equal protection prohibits state discrimination
against an individual because of his race, freedom of association, as in Alabama, pro-
hibits a state from discriminating against an organization because it is associated with a
civil rights movement. Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). And, while
freedom of speech prevents a state from punishing an individual for engaging in certain
activities, freedom of association may as in Button prevent a state from punishing an
organization for engaging in similar activities. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963).
10 To suggest that a court might do this seems irreverent, but see 30 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 325 (1964); McKay, "The Repression of Civil Rights as an Aftermath of the
School Segregation Cases," 4 How. LJ. 9 (1958). See note 9 supra; compare Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960),
which reversed convictions found so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to violate
due process.
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ganization and its financial foundation would be destroyed. The Button
reasoning should also prohibit a hostile state judiciary from preventing an
organization like the NAACP from using a picket line to publicize acts of
racial discrimination. Often public sanction is sufficient to remedy discrimi-
nation without recourse to the courts. Because of limited financial resources,
civil rights organizations have limited access to the primary media of com-
munication; the picket line may be the only medium available by which a
grievance can be communicated to the public. Therefore, to deprive its mem-
bers of the opportunity to protect their rights in this manner would greatly
diminish the effectiveness of the organization. Thus, Overstreet presents a
situation appropriate for review by the Court on freedom of association
grounds.
Freedom of Speech
Traditionally, the determination of liability for picketing has been
largely left to the trial court.1 Since picketing is an intentional interference
with a business' relations, under a tort theory it is actionable unless justi-
fied.12 It is not justified if conducted in an unlawful manner or for an un-
lawful purpose.18 The unlawful manner test imposes liability upon picketing
which is more than an honest and persuasive appeal. Thus, it is unlawful if
fraudulent, coercive, or threatens the peace. The unlawful purpose test re-
quires balancing the interests of the pickets, the picketed, and the public.
Hence, to a considerable extent it is based upon the exigencies of the case
and the good sense of the court.14
Freedom of speech has affected liability for picketing since Thornhill
v. Alabama'5 held that a state's blanket prohibition against picketing a place
of business was unconstitutional. Picketing is a medium of communication
protected by the first amendment. Although Thornhill led some to think that
the Supreme Court would rewrite the law of picketing, subsequent labor
cases have indicated the Court's satisfaction with the "lawful manner and
purpose test."'16 Thornhill's effect was to reassert the national interest in
protecting public discussion. The first and fourteenth amendments require
that the courts assign the proper weight to those values protected by freedom
11 Comment, 66 Yale LJ. 397, 411 (1956), suggests that the codification of the
common law of boycott could not pass the void-for-vagueness test because the law is
intended to give judges the very discretion in balancing interests which the vagueness doc-
trine prohibits.
12 Restatement, Torts § 767 (1939); Prosser, Torts § 987 (3d ed. 1964).
13 15 CJ.S. Conspiracy §§ 1, 3, 4 (1939).
14 Restatement, Torts § 767 (1939).
35 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
16 Tanenhaus, "Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of the New Law of Picketing
from 1940 to 1952," 38 Cornell L.Q. 1 (1952); Tanenhaus, "Picketing as Free Speech:
Early Stages in the Growth of the New Law of Picketing," 14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 397
(1953); Tanenhaus, 'Ticketing as a Tort: The Development of the Law of Picketing
from 1880 to 1940," 14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 170 (1953).
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of speech. But, the Court has recognized that the free speech aspects of
picketing may be outweighed by a legitimate state policy. The manner and
purpose of the picketing must be examined to determine if there are some rea-
sonable grounds for disallowing it.17
Should this test which examines the manner and purpose be applied to
a case of civil rights picketing, or is another test more appropriate? The
manner and purpose test permits the courts to weigh the interests of freedom
of speech and of the contestants in the context of each factual situation; it
allows flexibility. But this is a strong argument for not using the manner
and purpose test in civil rights cases. Uncertainty as to legal consequences
may deter civil rights groups from exercising their constitutionally protected
rights. Furthermore, flexibility provides an opportunity for misuse of the
test by a court hostile to the aims of the civil rights movement. Whether
flexibility can be preserved while constitutional rights are protected depends
on what the Supreme Court finds to be reasonable grounds for disallowing
civil rights picketing.
Merely because the Court has withdrawn all but nominal protection
from labor picketing'8 does not mean that any state policy will provide rea-
sonable grounds for disallowing civil rights picketing. Labor picketing must
be seen in its economic context. Labor picketing like any other economic
problem is subject to extensive public regulation in the public interest. But
civil rights picketing is a medium of expression, enmeshed in a social and
political context. 19 It is concerned with one of the most controversial public
issues of our day. All picketing should not be treated alike merely because
it can be differentiated from other forms of communication. The real basis
for distinction is not the form of communication, rather it is the content of
the communication evaluated in the context of its social and political set-
ting.2 0
There is a conflict between the interest protected by the civil law of
picketing and the values promoted by the first and fourteenth amendments. 2 '
When picketing is part of a public discussion on an important issue, it is en-
titled to more protection. But, the extent of protection depends on a balance
struck among the interests involved. After weighing the different interests
17 Thus, in Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), Mr. Justice Frank-
furter stated at 465-66: "Picketing is not beyond the control of the states if the manner
in which the picketing is conducted or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives
ground for its disallowance." The court upheld a state court injunction which forbade
picketing by a Negro group which sought quota hiring on the ground that it violated the
state's fair employment policy.
18 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Gibboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490 (1949).
19 Brown v. Louisiana, 34 U.S.L. Week 4143 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1966); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
20 Brown v. Louisiana, supra note 19; Stromberg v. California, 283 US. 359 (1931).
21 This analysis is based upon Mr. Justice Brennan's discussion of the constitutional
limits on the law of defamation in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 86 S. Ct. 669, 676 (1966).
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involved in labor and racial picketing, the courts have arrived at three posi-
tions: (1) civil rights picketing is not entitled to the protection afforded
labor picketing because it inflames racial tensions and creates greater likeli-
hood of violence and disorder; 22 (2) both kinds of picketing are equally
entitled to the protection afforded groups which desire to publicize their
grievances; 23 (3) civil rights picketing is entitled to more protection for
two reasons: (a) it is often an outburst by an oppressed group which may
have no other means of expressing its grievances; in this sense picketing
serves as a safety valve; 24 (b) a protest against racial discrimination is not
just an economic question, as it may be in the power struggle between labor
and management. 25 In a labor dispute the public's interest is primarily
limited to insuring a fair fight between the immediate contestants. The rules
of the game are questions of economic policy to be threshed out in legislative
halls.s However, civil rights picketing, to the extent that it represents a
protest against discrimination, is concerned with one of the most vital and
controversial issues of our day. To the extent that it represents state action, it
contravenes the Constitution, and hence is of paramount concern to the tri-
bunal whose duty it is to preserve that law. But, even when it does not involve
22 NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Green
v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 AtI. 109 (1935); A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153
Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; 48 Harv. L. Rev. 691 (1935). This reason-
ing was used in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 92 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir.
1937), which was reversed at 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
23 The Supreme Court adopted this position in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., supra note 22, which held that a Negro group's attempt to obtain employ-
ment involved a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Mr.
Justice Roberts stated at 561:
The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the part of
persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the removal of discriminations
against them by reason of their race or religious beliefs is quite as important to
those concerned as fairness and equity in terms and conditions of employment
can be to trade or craft unions or any form of labor organization or association.
See also Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization, 55 Ill. App. 2d 406, 204
N.E.2d 589 (1965); Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe, 171 Misc. 279, 12 N.Y.S.2d 400
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
24 Lawton v. Murray, 61 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See Julie Baking Co. v.
Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y. Supp. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1934), which allowed a group
of angry consumers to picket a bakery in protest against extortionate prices. The Court
stated, picketing "is salutary to the state, in that it serves as a safety valve in times of
stress and strain." Id. at 849, 274 N.Y. Supp. at 252.
25 See Mr. justice Douglas concurring in Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 US.
799 (1941).
26 To a large extent the rules of the game have been laid down in federal labor
legislation. See the majority and dissenting opinions in Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers of America, 86 S. Ct. 657 (1966). See also Teller, 'Ticketing and Free Speech,"
56 Harv. L. Rev. 180 (1942); Dodd, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 Harv.




state action, it is a highly controversial issue well within the ambit of consti-
tutionally protected dialogue. The third position has apparently been adopted
by the Supreme Court, and thus it should closely review a civil rights picket-
ing decision on freedom of speech principles, as well as those of freedom of
association.
SuPREME CoURT REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
A decision in a picketing case is based on a factual determination of the
manner and purpose of the picketing and the application of a broad legal
standard to the facts as found 2 7 However, the fact finding may conceal
prejudice or sloppy reasoning, and the legal standard is so broad that it has
little meaning apart from its application to particular cases. Hence, effective
constitutional protection depends upon whether the Court will review the
evidence. Two recent cases indicate the Court's position. In Cox v. Louisi-
ana2 8 the Court overturned breach of the peace and obstructing the sidewalk
convictions of the leader of 1500 Negro demonstrators who assembled at a
courthouse to protest the arrest of fellow students who had picketed stores
with segregated lunch counters. The Court undertook an independent exami-
nation of the record and found no conduct which the state had a right to
punish. In New York Times v. Sullivan the Court stated, "We must 'make
an independent examination of the whole record' . . . so as to assure our-
selves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion of the
field of free expression." 29 After reviewing the evidence, the Court stated:
"[T]he proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity
which the Constitutional standard demands ... ."30 Cox and Times suggest
that judgments in civil rights picketing cases must be supported by an in-
dependent examination of the whole record, and that unlawful motive must
be shown with convincing clarity.
The Overstreet decision illustrated the importance of applying these
two principles to civil rights picketing decisions, since it was based on the
determination of three mental states. Firstly, the Georgia court found that
the NAACP, its picketers, and members of the crowd who joined the picketers
were all united by a common motive; thus, the finding of a conspiracy was
justified. Secondly, they were motivated by a desire to punish the grocer for
the beating rather than a desire to protest racial discrimination. The grocer
was not motivated by racial prejudice; hence, freedom of speech afforded no
protection to the picketing. Thirdly, the court also noted that the picketers'
motive was malevolent so that punitive damages were properly awarded.
The determination of mental states requires a careful weighing of all the
27 U.S. Const. Amends. XIII, XIV, XV; Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962);
United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1959); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Railway Main Ass'n v. Corsi, 326
U.S. 88 (1945).
28 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
29 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). (Citation omitted.)
3o 376 U.S. at 285-86.
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evidence, and thus there is an opportunity for the projection of prejudice
into a decision. These determinations must be subject to review.
CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING PROTECTED PICKETING
When the Supreme Court examines the evidence in a civil rights picket-
ing decision, it must determine whether the picketing was conducted in a
lawful manner and for a lawful purpose. Making this determination requires
a careful balancing of the values protected by freedom of speech and the
interests protected by the civil law of picketing. Several criteria appear to
have emerged from recent civil rights cases.
L wfuZ Manner
In applying the lawful manner test, the primary problem is determining
when picketers should be liable for the acts of onlookers. Civil rights picket-
ing draws crowds, some hostile and some sympathetic. Although it may be
relatively easy to identify acts which should not be committed by the pick-
eters, it is not so clear whether the picketers should be liable if the same acts
are committed by onlookers. Thus, it is clear that picketers may not commit
acts of violence nor frighten customers from the door by intimidating acts,
but what if onlookers become riotous or drive customers away? There are
circumstances under which a man may be civilly liable if his negligence
causes a third party to commit an unlawful act.3 ' But generally he will not be
liable unless he intended that the third party act unlawfully. The Court has
held that a state may not punish civil rights demonstrators merely because
they attract a hostile crowd and require police protection.32 But, these cases
dealt with public demonstrations and not with picketing a private business.
Whether a different rule should apply in the latter instance would seem to be
determined by weighing the interest in protesting discrimination against the
interest in protecting the reputation of a business which allegedly practices
racial discrimination. Considering the nation's commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
the interest in protecting public discussion of an issue as important as racial
discrimination should prevail. 3 Hence, it would seem that proof of intent
should be required before liability for "unlawful manner" picketing is im-
posed upon picketers for the acts of onlookers.
81 Prosser, Torts § 33 (3d ed. 1964). But the author states at 176: "There is
normally much less reason to anticipate acts on the part of others which are malicious
and intentionally damaging than those which are merely negligent; and this is all the
more true where, as is usually the case, such acts are criminal."
82 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 Us.
229 (1963).
33 The balance struck here is between the interest in protecting public discussion
of a public issue and the interest in protecting a business' reputation. Compare with
this the differing balances advocated by the Justices in the sit-in cases where the question
was equal protection. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 267 (1963). Compare also the balance struck under the public accommodations
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(2) (1964).
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The Overstreet case illustrates the conflicting interests behind the choice
of the proper rule of liability for "unlawful manner" picketing. The NAACP
pickets attracted a sympathetic crowd. Members of the crowd committed
several acts of violence, and customers were intimidated. But, to impose
liability upon the NAACP for the unintended and unpredictable acts of a
crowd would sharply deter the use of pickets to protest against discriminatory
acts. On the other hand, the grocer should be entitled to some relief. His
remedy was, of course, to sue those who committed the unlawful acts or to
have the police disperse or arrest unruly onlookers. For the NAACP picket-
ing to have been conducted in an unlawful manner, the picketers must have
intended the crowd to become riotous. The mere presence of the NAACP
pickets should not have been a sufficient basis for liability, even if their
presence caused the crowd to gather.
Lawful Purpose
Picketing, to be lawful, must be conducted for a lawful purpose as well
as in a lawful manner. Criteria for determining lawful purpose are based on
balancing the interests of the picketers, the picketed, and the public. The
public's interest in protecting public discussion is guarded by the first and
fourteenth amendments. Civil rights picketing addresses itself to one of the
most controversial issues of our day. Hence, the interest protected by the
civil law of picketing must yield in the absence of a strong countervailing
interest. 34 Where there is a countervailing interest and an effective alternative
remedy available to protest against discrimination, civil rights picketing
should not be protected.
Decisions considering public demonstrations which urge public officials
or the public generally to end segregation have established that protests
against discrimination are precisely that sort of expression which the first
amendment was intended to protect.32 But beyond this, picketing a private
34 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964); Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d
114 (5th Cir. 1964); City of Sumter v. Lewis, 241 S.C. 364, 128 S.E.2d 684 (1962).
But see NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), rev'd
for mootness, 376 U.S. 190 (1964); Clemmons v. CORE, 201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La.
1962). The convictions in Clemmons arising out of the demonstration were reversed in
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). The Court has stated that discrimination inter-
feres with the free flow of goods and persons within the country by placing an artificial
stricture on commerce. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The equal protection clause prohibits any
form of state action which promotes or sanctions racial discrimination. A state may not
make its judicial machinery available to its citizens to effect a policy of racial discrimina-
tion. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
How, then, can a state court hold that the interest of those protesting against dis-
crimination is not superior to the interest of a business which practices it? But see Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.. 226 (1964). Discrimination also violates the fifth amendment due
process clause because it is contrary to fundamental concepts of fairness. Bolling v.
Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
35 Mr. Justice Stewart stated that Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963),
revealed an exercise of freedom of speech in its "most pristine and classic form."
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business which practices discrimination should also be within the ambit of
freedom of speech. In Thornhill v. Alabama Mr. Justice Murphy stated:
"Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period." 36 Thornhill taught that picketing connected with a labor dispute
could contribute to constitutionally protected dialogue because it provided
the workingman an opportunity to express his view in the dispute. This
afforded the public an opportunity to hear both sides and to react accordingly.
The fact that the reaction might be social ostracism or economic pressure
against a business rather than political action did not make the labor dispute
any less of a public issue. Nor was the form of communication a satisfactory
basis for identifying constitutionally protected dialogue. The Constitution
looks to the content of the communication evaluated in the context of its
social and political setting. Picketing is a medium which can be used to de-
bate the racial issue by groups which do not have access to the more sophis-
ticated forms of communication.
However, the cases which concern picketing to compel employers to
hire Negroes, illustrate that a strong countervailing interest and an effective
alternative remedy may justify withholding constitutional protection from
certain picketing to protest discrimination.37 These cases distinguish be-
tween protesting against discrimination and compelling an employer to hire
Negroes.38 Picketing of the latter sort violates a policy of permitting hiring
based on merit. It also encourages Negroes to organize and compete with
white organizations for jobs, thus heightening racial tensions.39 Furthermore,
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196440 and fair employment legislation
enacted by many states provide a remedy for victims of discriminatory hiring
practices in many cases. Thus, it is possible to declare picketing to secure
Negro employment unlawful without sacrificing either the policy supporting
a protest against discrimination or the policy against labor organized along
racial lines. Where an employer is not covered by fair employment legisla-
tion, the reasoning of Mr. justice Traynor is persuasive:
In their struggle for equality the only effective economic weapon
Negroes have is the purchasing power they are able to mobilize to
induce employers to open jobs to them . . . . There are so few
36 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
37 Rosen, "The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment," 53 Calif. L. Rev.
729 (1965); Note, 18 U. Miami L. Rev. 488 (1963).
38 Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948). The court
stated, "It may be assumed for the purpose of this decision, without deciding that if
such discrimination exists, picketing to protest it would not be an unlawful objective.
However, no such broad purpose is shown to have motivated the activities here." Id. at
855, 192 P.2d at 888. See also Fair Share Organization v. Mitnick, 134 Ind. App. 675,
188 N.E.2d 840 (1963); Young Adults for Progressive Action, Inc. v. B & B Cash
Grocery Stores, Inc., 151 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
39 Liefshitz v. Straughn, 261 App. Div. 757, 27 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1941).
40 78 Stat. 266, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
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neighborhoods where Negroes can make effective appeals against
discrimination that they may reasonably regard the seeking of jobs
in neighborhoods where their appeal may be effective the only prac-
tical means of combating discrimination against them. In arbitrat-
ing the conflicting interests of different groups in society courts
should not impose ideal standards on one side when they are power-
less to impose similar standards upon the other.41
In Overstreet the Georgia Supreme Court found two reasons for de-
claring the purpose of the picketing to be unlawful. It found a countervailing
policy and an alternative remedy to justify imposing liability upon a protest
against racial discrimination. In the words of the court: "If he, [the grocer]
as defendants contend, committed an assault and battery upon an employee,
that is a criminal act, the punishment of which rests with the courts and not
with private individuals. Otherwise we have anarchy.142 Thus, since the
purpose of the picketers was to punish the grocer for his criminal act, it was
unlawful because it usurped the function of the courts. The court also found
that there had been no racial discrimination and, therefore, the picketing was
not entitled to constitutional protection. In the words of the court: "The
single incident, whether caused by plaintiff firing the boy or whipping him-
whichever is true-and the evidence as to what occurred is inconclusive,
would not justify the conclusion that the boy's race had anything to do with
it. There is no evidence that what happened occurred because he was a
Negro. It might as well have happened to a white boy. This is obviously not
a case of peaceful picketing to protest racial discrimination. '43 The court
concluded that since there was no racial prejudice, the constitutional protec-
tion afforded protests against discrimination did not apply.
While the policy favoring the integrity of the judicial process may in
some cases outweigh the policies behind civil rights picketing, it is not so
clear that Overstreet was such a case. In Cox v. Louisiana,44 the Supreme
Court held that a state may prohibit picketing around its courthouses in order
to protect them from the influences of the mob. In Overstreet, however, the
picketing was conducted for the purpose of calling the public's attention to
the commission of a crime.
If the grocer committed neither a criminal act nor an act of racial dis-
crimination, then picketing constituted a misrepresentation. According to
the common law, picketing is entitled to protection only so long as it is
honest; the risk of liability for misrepresentations is placed upon the one
making the assertions.45 This is the policy of the law of libel and the law of
disparagement, and to the extent that picketing is communication it should
seemingly be treated analogously. But it can be persuasively argued that the
strong constitutional policies behind protests against racial discrimination
41 Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 868, 198 P.2d 885, 896 (1948) (dis-
senting opinion).
42 NAACP v. Overstreet, 321 Ga. 16, -, 142 S.E.2d 816, 823 (1965).
43 Id. at 831.
44 379 US. 536 (1965).
45 Prosser, Torts § 124 (3d ed. 1964).
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should protect protests which are made in good faith even if no discriminatory
acts are committed. New York Times v. Sullivan46 requires proof of actual
malice for recovery in an action for libel of a public official. The Court rea-
soned that if proof of actual malice were not required, the fear of civil lia-
bility would deter honest criticism. Democracy demands that criticism of
public officials be encouraged, so that government may remain responsive.
Even beyond the case of public officials, cases involving speech are to
be considered against the background of a profound commitment to the
principle that debate should be uninhibited, and that it may well include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attack.4T Does the same
reasoning apply to protests against racial discrimination? Imposing liability
for false protests against discrimination which are made in good faith would
undoubtedly have a deterring effect. But, does the social harm caused by the
deterring effect outweigh the social harm caused by damaging the reputation
or good will of an innocent business? The question requires a delicate balanc-
ing of conflicting policies.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the right of Negroes to organize to protect themselves
against discrimination should be protected from the civil laws just as much
as from the criminal laws. Consequently, the Supreme Court should review
and reverse a picketing case on the grounds of freedom of association if a
lower court applies the law in such a way as to discriminate against a civil
rights organization. Furthermore, the Court should closely supervise a state
court's application of the lawful manner and lawful purpose tests to insure
freedom of speech. Picketing is not conducted in an unlawful manner merely
because onlookers commit coercive or violent acts unless the picketers in-
tended that they act unlawfully. Picketing which represents a protest against
discrimination is not conducted for an unlawful purpose unless there is a
strong policy against the picketing and an alternative remedy available to
attack the discriminatory practices. A civil rights organization should be per-
mitted to protest against a discriminatory act even if the act is also a crime.
It should not be liable if it in good faith falsely accuses a business of racial
discrimination.
46 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
47 This reasoning has been applied to libel actions in the labor-management field.
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 86 S. Ct. 657 (1966). See also Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 86 S. Ct. 669 (1966).
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